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1.- We comment herein the articles of association of a new bank 
incorporated in Italy in May 2007 and recently authorized by the Bank of Italy, 
whose corporate scope is social banking1. This initiative is noticeable in size 
and in character. Noticeable in size, because the new bank (called “Prossima 
s.p.a.”) is a fully owned subsidiary of “Intesa San Paolo”, a major Italian player 
in the national banking industry. As such, it is capitalized over € 100 millions 
and shall operate nationally and internationally also through the existing 
network of “Banca Intesa San Paolo”. Noticeable in character, because the new 
venture features a remarkable market response to increasing social demand for 
more responsible banking model both for the not for profit sector and the 
communities of the “unbanked” (and/or the “underbanked”). This new venture 
is thus interesting, from a legal perspective, under several aspects.  
 
 
2.- First of all, because it has been grounded on the Italian regulatory 
framework of joint stock companies (rather than on that of cooperatives, as it 
was the case, e.g., of the pre-existing Italian “Banca Popolare Etica”), whereby 
making it clear that the bank, notwithstanding its social orientation, is designed 
to operate as a viable and lasting economic venture for profit. At the same time, 
however, the articles of association voluntarily and deliberately depart from 
profit maximization, by explicitly stressing – already in Article 6 – that the 
company shall necessarily reconcile between its economic and social 
performance. As stipulated by Article 6: 
 
A servizio delle finalità di cui all’articolo 4, la società effettua i propri impieghi nel pieno 
rispetto del principio di economicità d’azione e nel perseguimento sia di utili annuali di 
gestione sia di creazione e accumulazione di valore per la società e i soci avendo tra i 
suoi obiettivi prioritari l’offerta di favorevoli condizioni di accesso al credito alle imprese 
sociali e alle altre organizzazioni non profit che svolgano la propria attività in Italia e/o 
all’estero. La società destina inoltre una quota  dei propri impieghi a favorire l’accesso al 
credito - specie per il sostegno di iniziative di lavoro autonomo e/o imprenditoriale o per 
esigenze sanitarie e di accompagnamento o educative o per l’acquisto della prima casa - 
di tutti coloro che, in considerazione della loro razza, provenienza geografica, estrazione 
sociale, sesso, età o condizione hanno insufficiente accesso al credito. Essa si avvale del 
proprio patrimonio anche per partecipare a programmi, pubblici o privati, di sostegno, 
cooperazione e sviluppo e a fondi di garanzia o altri fondi rotativi per il finanziamento e 
lo sviluppo o partecipare a società di promozione e sviluppo, anche compartecipate da 
terzi, pubblici o privati. La società promuove, in Italia e all’estero, interventi di 
                                                 
1 On social banking see, in the Italian literature AA.VV., Il social banking in Italia: un 
fenomeno da esplorare, a cura di Anderloni, Milano, 2003, passim (and here, for legal 
reasoning, Fauceglia G. and Porzio M.; the contribution of the latter is also re-published in 
Porzio M., Orme sulla neve, Milano, 2006); Antonucci A., La responsabilità sociale d’impresa, 
in NGCC, 2007, II, p. 119, especially at 126. See also ABI, Linee guida sulla responsabilità 
sociale d’impresa in banca, Roma, 2005, passim. 
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microfinanza e microcredito, diretti e indiretti, anche attraverso continuativi programmi 
di assistenza tecnica volti a sostenere la nascita e il rafforzamento di sistemi di autoaiuto 
e microcredito.  
 
In turn, the same provision is very explicit in excluding from the bank’s 
corporate scope any confusion between social banking and granting and/or 
charitable activity.  
 
La società esclude dalle proprie finalità l’attività di mera erogazione a fondo perduto, 
proponendosi di attuare una gestione economica sostenibile anche nel medio e nel lungo 
periodo delle proprie risorse idonea ad ampliare costantemente il numero dei clienti e ad 
accumulare capitale economico e sociale per le finalità di cui al precedente art. 4. 
 
This would in fact contradict economic sustainability in the long run and would 
“dissipate” in a one shot game resources which, on the contrary, are intended to 
be accumulated and serve as an intergenerational engine for social change. The 
bank, in other terms, does not represent a new vehicle set up to concentrate “in a 
single shop“ all the philanthropic and charitable activities that are traditionally 
carried out by “Intesa San Paolo” (activities which continue to be managed as 
before). Instead, what is being established is a proper new bank that is willing to 
profitably operate with the not for profit sector and all those who do not have, or 
have insufficient recourse to credit, for the benefit of its shareholders, 
stakeholders (herein included its clients) and the community at large. As set out 
in Article 4 (which posits the foundations of the bank’s social mission):  
 
La società, avendo cura di preservare appieno la propria sostenibilità di 
impresa e di operare nel pieno rispetto della normativa e del criterio della 
sana e prudente gestione, ha come obiettivo la creazione di valore sociale, 
nei limiti e nel rispetto dell’oggetto sociale di cui agli artt. 5 e 6 dello 
Statuto. A tale fine la società sosterrà con il credito le migliori iniziative 
non profit per i servizi alla persona, la diffusione della cultura e 
dell’istruzione, la fruizione e la protezione dell’ambiente e dell’arte, 
l’accesso al credito e al lavoro.  
 
Another remarkable feature of this ambitious program is its international reach 
which is not confined to Italian territory. The closing paragraph of Article 4 
recognizes indeed that: 
 
La società si impegnerà affinché i prodotti, i servizi e gli schemi di 
finanziamento che realizzerà in Italia siano applicati, per quanto 
possibile e consentito e con gli adattamenti necessari, ai paesi stranieri 
nei quali il gruppo bancario “Intesa Sanpaolo” opera 
 
 
3.- Secondly, the mediation between the reasons of capital and the 
expectations of the communities (in other terms: the mechanism that bridges 
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between the shareholders' expectations for profit and the social expectations of 
other stakeholders)  is translated into an innovative (so, at least, to the best of 
our knowledge) legal provision concerning the allocation of yearly profits. As it 
can be read under Article 28 of the by-laws: 
 
L’utile netto risultante dal bilancio, dedotta la quota di riserva legale e salvo ogni 
ulteriore accantonamento previsto dalla vigente normativa, viene ripartito come segue: a) 
a riserva statutaria non distribuibile nel corso della società una quota pari al costo del 
capitale investito dalla Banca, determinato secondo le tecniche finanziare comunemente 
in uso nel mercato; b) alle azioni un dividendo determinato dall’Assemblea in misura non 
superiore al [50] % dell’utile netto annuale quale residuante una volta effettuato 
l’accantonamento di cui alla precedente lettera a); c) tutto il rimanente alle finalità di 
solidarietà e sviluppo, tramite destinazione ad un apposito Fondo per lo sviluppo e 
l’impresa sociale. Tale Fondo  garantisce i rischi e fronteggia le perdite - secondo la 
procedura in appresso descritta - derivanti dagli impieghi per finalità di solidarietà e 
sviluppo che la società può effettuare a condizioni di tasso agevolato rispetto a quelli 
correnti di mercato o a favore di soggetti che risulterebbero non avere, o avere 
insufficiente accesso al credito secondo linee di impiego tradizionali. Qualora, al termine 
dell’esercizio, la società chiuda il bilancio in perdita e tale perdita sia da attribuirsi, in 
tutto o in parte, a perdite sugli impieghi per finalità di solidarietà e sviluppo, tali perdite 
saranno interamente ripianate utilizzando a copertura il Fondo per lo sviluppo e l'impresa 
sociale. Nel caso in cui siffatte perdite, per la loro entità, non possano essere 
integralmente coperte mediante utilizzo del detto Fondo, l’utile netto degli esercizi 
successivi, dedotta la quota di riserva legale, dovrà essere prioritariamente destinato a 
ripristinare nell’ammontare preesistente l’entità delle poste del patrimonio netto, escluso 
il predetto Fondo, che siano state incise dalle suddette perdite. Qualora, viceversa, le 
perdite di esercizio siano da attribuirsi ad altre cause e non dipendano dall’attività di 
impiego per finalità di solidarietà e sviluppo, il Fondo di cui alla lettera c) potrà essere 
utilizzato a copertura delle perdite solo dopo che, a tale scopo, siano state utilizzate le 
altre riserve volontarie e statutarie, ivi compresa la riserva di cui alla precedente lettera 
a). In caso di utilizzo del Fondo di cui alla lettera c) a copertura di perdite non derivanti 
da impieghi per finalità di solidarietà e sviluppo, l’utile netto dei due esercizi successivi, 
dedotta la quota di riserva legale, dovrà essere prioritariamente destinato a ripristinare il 
detto Fondo nell’ammontare preesistente. 
 
This indicates that yearly disposable profits shall be divided into two principal 
parts. One part devoted, in a specific amount set by the Articles of association, 
to the further capitalisation of the bank through a net worth reserve not 
distributable until dissolution. Whereas the remaining part is virtually shared 
between shareholders and stakeholders on an equal footing (unless shareholders 
agree to accept less than the maximum amount of dividends to which they are 
entitled in principle, leaving more resources to the reserve used for corporate 
social responsibility operations). Shareholders are indeed free to resolve in their 
ordinary shareholders’ meeting a distribution of dividends up to the 50% of 
such remaining net profits. Stakeholders shall benefit from all the remaining 
part through the accumulation of such amount in a specific reserve, the (so 
called) “fund for the development and social undertakings”. This fund does not 
result in a separate legal entity (as would have been the case if the accumulated 
amount was segregated in trust or allocated to an external charitable 
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foundation) but remains under the management of the bank's board of directors. 
However, this fund is specifically designated to “face the risks and cover the 
losses” stemming from the social banking activities undertaken by the bank in 
favour of its social constituencies.  
 
In particular, when the bank, in conformity with the aims set out in Articles 4-6, 
lends with interest rates which are below custom market interest rates, the “day 
one loss” (should this loss become a yearly loss) shall be covered by the fund. 
Similarly, if the bank lends to a person who, according to custom market 
practices on risk management, is not “bankable” (or is not entitled to receive a 
loan, according to ordinary practices, in the amount needed), in case of default 
of such borrower, the loss is covered by the fund. Clearly enough, due to the 
coexistence of some corporate and non segregated funds for the benefit of 
shareholders and some other corporate and non segregated funds for the benefit 
of stakeholders within a single entity, the proper satisfaction of the expectations 
of all these different constituencies – as well as the fulfilment of the additional 
corporate mission to perpetuate this banking model through time in an 
intergenerational bond, on top of that -  relies, in this model, on corporate 
governance devices. It remains, in other terms, under the responsibility of the 
board of directors to align the behaviour of the company – profitable banking 
and social banking for the present and the years to come – along the lines of 
this nexus of multi-stakeholders’ expectations. Losses deriving from for-profit 
banking and/or social banking are in principle to be resented each by its 
relevant constituency, as it is shown by the rules concerning coverage of losses 
which distinguish among the different sources of losses to consistently identify 
the funds to be used for their coverage. This is true however only if the yearly 
bottom line is negative (on the contrary it has been set in the Articles that, as 
long as the company concludes the year with a profit, no constituency should 
blame the other if profits are less than they would have been if the bank had not 
operated in the other sector) and it remains true only if and when the 
constituency being affected by the loss is in condition to face alone such loss or 
to repay it in due course. This is obviously so, because – as indicated- there is 
no asset partitioning and segregation.  
 
 
4.- In order to facilitate the board of directors in duly performing its 
difficult task – being an active and profitable banker on the one hand and, at the 
same time, a respectable social banker on the other hand -  the corporate 
governance of the bank is enriched with a new and innovative organ: the 
committee for the solidarity and development (hereinafter – Committee). This 
Committee comprises of 6 members with staggered office (in order to ensure 
continuity of action), 3 of which are appointed by the shareholders’ meeting 
and the other 3 designated by 3 separate external appointing authorities (the 
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President of the Republic, the President of the EU Parliament and the President 
of the supervisory authority for not for profit organizations), all among 
candidates possessing consistent professional qualifications. Article 29 sets out 
in fact that: 
 
E’ istituito un Comitato per la Solidarietà e lo Sviluppo composto di sei membri di 
riconosciuto prestigio e indipendenza, scelti tra personalità che abbiano ricoperto incarichi 
di rilievo in ambito istituzionale o del non profit in Italia o all’estero, accademici, esponenti 
del mondo imprenditoriale e manageriale che abbiano maturato significative esperienze nel 
settore del non profit, della cooperazione allo sviluppo, del microcredito o della 
microfinanza.   
 
The most relevant innovation concerning this new organ refers to its functions. 
The Committee does not limit itself to advisory functions with respect to the 
“ethical” profile of the venture (as it is to be found in other cases of corporate 
social responsibility). Instead, albeit without interfering with the exclusive 
competence of the board in the management of the company – the Committee 
provides framework principles and general indications and recommendations to 
the board with respect to social banking, focussing in particular on the use of the 
fund for the development considered above. As stipulated by Article 32: 
 
Il Comitato, in coerenza con le finalità di cui all’ art. 4 e con quanto previsto all’art. 6,  elabora, nel 
rispetto delle inderogabili competenze del Consiglio di Amministrazione e nel pieno rispetto del 
principio di sana e prudente gestione, se del caso anche mediante regolamento, gli indirizzi circa le 
attività di solidarietà e sviluppo di cui la società possa farsi carico, vigila, ferma restando la 
inderogabile competenza degli organi di controllo interno ed esterno della società, che l’attività di 
amministrazione sia realizzata, quanto alle attività di solidarietà e sviluppo, nel rispetto dei suoi 
indirizzi e secondo principi di buona amministrazione, economicità e trasparenza, avendo cura 
prioritaria che le risorse della società destinate a finalità di solidarietà e sviluppo siano utilizzate in 
condizioni di duratura sostenibilità economica e escludendo l’erogazione a fondo perduto. 
 
Under Article 33, the same Committee is responsible for the social balance 
sheet and is subject to a transparency requirement: 
 
 Il Comitato informa del suo operato l’Assemblea, almeno una volta all’anno in occasione 
della approvazione del bilancio di esercizio e provvede, d’intesa con il Presidente del 
Consiglio di Amministrazione, a dare adeguata informazione periodica al mercato e al 
pubblico in genere dell’attività svolta e dei progetti approvati. Il Comitato redige e 
presenta annualmente un rapporto pubblico di fine esercizio sull’efficacia e coerenza 
degli interventi effettuati. 
 
 
 5.- Having outlined the hallmarks of the articles of association of this 
new company devoted to social banking, it might prove useful, for its 
 7
assessment against the backdrop of current practices on corporate social 
responsibility, to briefly overview the (still) flourishing debate on corporate 
social responsibility (hereinafter - CSR). 
 
Empirically, there has been a dramatic growth in social and environmental 
reporting among corporations, and countless initiatives have been launched by 
both private and public sector, on regional, national and international levels. 
Consumers and investors made themselves part of this process, e.g. showing 
their capacity to influence corporations through consumption preferences and 
ethical investment choices. New mechanisms, including specialized investment 
funds and indexes, reporting and auditing standards, codes of conducts and 
guidelines were created to satisfy the increasing public demand for corporate 
social responsibility and to facilitate socially responsible investment and 
consumption. To this end, CSR has become more than a popular buzz word in 
the corporate world, as it turned into an industry of its own, due to the 
substantial resources which are poured into socially responsible investment 
(SRI) funds.  
 
However, it should be reminded that CSR is not a new phenomenon: the role of 
the corporate entity in capitalist societies has been debated by historians, 
economists and legal scholars for over a century2. The appearance of CSR as a 
social movement occurred in the 1970’s and it strongly reemerged in recent 
years, especially in reaction to globalization and its consequences. The growing 
awareness to environmental and social issues has boosted the expansion of the 
awareness to CSR. To this end, the role of technology and the media cannot be 
overstated. Past experience shows that information about negative externalities 
which are often associated with corporate production such as pollution, poverty, 
exploitation of child labor, poor working conditions, safety hazards as well as 
violations of human rights in third world countries, can no longer be withheld 
from the eyes of the media and the public at large. Consequently, social 
pressure for greater corporate transparency and accountability gained 
substantial public support and business corporations were forced to revisit their 
corporate policies. These developments are attracting overwhelming attention, 
positive as well as negative, in the EU and elsewhere3. The academic and public 
                                                 
2 See Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A 
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 
Vol. 30, No. 3, 2005, pp. 767-818 
3 For the state of CSR and social reporting around the world see KPMG International Survey of 
Corporate Responsibility Reporting, Amsterdam, 2005. For a comparative look on CSR see 
Habisch A.(eds.), Corporate Social Responsibility Across Europe, Springer, 2004; OECD, 
Corporate Responsibility Practices of Emerging Market Companies - A Fact Finding Study, 
2005 
 8
debates over CSR have left their mark on corporate decision making processes 
and had a significant impact on policy makers all over the world. 
 
 
6.- While regulating CSR is tough enough, defining it is even tougher. 
An inquiry into the contemporary literature on the subject reveals that the scope 
and nature of the social responsibility of firms is subject to various 
interpretations4. As noted by Votaw5, the term social responsibility is a brilliant 
one; it means something, but not always the same thing to everybody. Clearly, 
what constitutes CSR depends on the particular situation of individual 
enterprises and on the specific context in which they operate. The EU 
Commission defines CSR as a concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction 
with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis6. There are various interpretations 
for CSR in the academic literature, most of which describe voluntary 
integration of social and environmental concerns by corporations in their 
business operations and interactions with stakeholders. Not surprisingly, some 
interpretations are extremely narrow while others are very broad. A well known 
illustration of a narrow definition appears in Milton Friedman’s famous piece 
titled “The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits”7. 
McWilliams, Siegel and Wright8 define CSR as situations where the firm goes 
beyond compliance and engages in actions that appear to further some social 
good, beyond the interests of the firm and what is required by law. Parkinson 
describes it as a process concept that focuses on the characteristics of the 
corporate decision making process and not on particular outcomes9. Another 
prominent scholar defines CSR as practices that improve the workplace and 
benefit society in ways that go above and beyond what companies are legally 
required to do10. According to Baron11, CSR exclusively describes corporate 
                                                 
4 For an exhaustive description of the evolutional definition of CSR see Caroll A., Corporate 
Social Responsibility – Evolution of a Definitional Construct, . Business & Society, vol. 38/3, 
1999, pp. 268-295. 
5 Votaw D., Genius Becomes Rare, in D. Votaw and S.P. Sethi (eds), The Corporate Dilemma: 
Traditional Values versus Contemporary Problems, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1973, 
pp. 11-45. 
6 Commission of The European Communities, Promoting a European Framework for 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Green Paper COM(2001)366 Final, Brussels 2001 
7 Friedman M., The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, The New York 
Times Magazine, September 13, 1970. 
8 McWilliams et al, Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic Implications, Journal of 
Management Studies, Vol. 43 No.1, 2006, pp. 1-18  
9 Parkinson J.E., Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the theory of company law, 
Oxford University Press, 1993 
10 Vogel D., The Market For Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Brookings Institutions Press, Washington D.C. 2005  
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actions that are motivated by normative principles other than profit 
maximization. Corporations’ engagement in social or environmental activities 
that is motivated by business considerations and the desire to maximize profits 
has become known as strategic CSR. Choosing the right terminology is a 
considerable challenge. The problem with many of the existing definitions is 
that they consist of elusive normative notions which are difficult to measure 
and quantify. Therefore, picking the most accurate or sensible definition for 
CSR is clearly not an easy task, as it depends, among other things, on subjective 
interpretations of responsibility, sustainability and corporate citizenship. It is 
important to stress that the term CSR is attached to for profit business 
corporations rather than other business enterprises and organizations. This 
reflects the inherent tension between the pursuit for profit and concern over 
shareholder value on the one hand, and the legitimate interests of other 
stakeholders which relate to a broader social and environmental context, on the 
other hand. 
 
 
7.- Taking into account the fair amount of confusion which 
characterizes the subject matter, a few clarifying words on the main 
controversies with relation to CSR might prove necessary. 
 
There are three issues upon which there is no dispute: First, the fact that CSR 
relates to voluntary corporate actions which go beyond legal requirements. 
Thus, compliance with existing laws and adherence to mandatory regulations 
does not constitute CSR per se. CSR requires the corporation to go beyond the 
law. For example, in a situation where the government sets mandatory 
minimum standards on pollution, CSR would imply polluting less than is 
legally permitted rather than just complying with the standard. Second, it is 
widely accepted that engagement in CSR is costly to the corporation in terms of 
resources as it consumes time as well as financial and human capital. Third, 
evidence shows that corporate engagement in CSR as well as corporate social 
reporting is constantly growing. Interestingly, the pattern of social reporting 
varies significantly among countries and between industries. For example, in 
Japan and the UK social reporting is by far more common than in Continental 
Europe and the US. Another intriguing finding is the apparent lack of a 
correlation between investment in CSR and financial performance. A series of 
empirical studies carried out up to date were not able to confirm the existence 
of a statistically significant correlation between social and environmental 
performance and financial performance. More accurately, the results are mixed 
                                                                                                                                  
11 Baron, David P., A Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social Pressure, and Corporate 
Social Performance, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 
1940, 2006, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=913808 
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and indecisive – few studies indicate that there is a positive correlation, some 
studies provide evidence for a negative correlation and other studies conclude 
that there is no correlation whatsoever12. Based on these empirical findings and 
given the considerable costs of CSR, it is unclear why do many corporations 
choose to invest resources in CSR if the financial outcome of such investment 
is so ambiguous. According to the traditional theory of the firm, corporations 
are run to maximize profits and shareholder value. This theory predicts that 
managers are devoted only to maximize shareholders value and justifies it 
under the contractarian view of the firm in which shareholders function as 
residual claimants. According to this view, CSR should not and will not occur 
unless it increases corporate profits or boosts shareholder value. The problem 
with this theory is that in the absence of any substantial statistical evidence for 
a relationship between CSR and financial performance, the current trend of 
engagement in CSR cannot be easily explained. Several possible reasons for 
this apparent anomaly, often referred to as the puzzle of CSR, could be found in 
the literature. Assuming that corporations are indeed rational and profit 
oriented, the possibility that many of them are acting irrationally is ruled out. It 
is plausible that CSR somehow enhances financial performance and increases 
shareholder value in the long run, although it is not clear how it works in 
practice. It may also be that CSR reflects a corporate response to a growing 
social pressure which translates to demand among consumers, investors, 
employees and the general public for greater corporate attention to social and 
environmental concerns. Studies claim that consumers put a high value on 
corporate social and environmental performance. Empirical studies reveal a gap 
between these assertions and data on actual consumer behavior both in Europe 
and the US13. Apparently, the willingness to pay for “green” or “ethical” 
products is relatively limited.  
 
 
8.- In turn, the growth of socially responsible investment (“SRI”) funds 
reflects an increasing level of involvement on behalf of individual and mainly 
institutional investors, such as pension funds especially in the UK14. The 
                                                 
12 For an overview of the different empirical studies and their results see McWilliams et al, 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic Implications, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 
43 No.1, 2006, pp. 1-18; Becchetti L. et al, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate 
Performance: Evidence from a Panel of US Listed Companies, CEIS Working Paper No. 78, 
2005, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=871402  
13 Vogel, D., The Market for Virtue – The Potentials and Limits of Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Harrisonburg, VA, Brookings Institution Press, 2005. 
14 Aguilera et al, Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: a comparative analysis of 
the UK and the US, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 14, May 2006 pp. 
147-158; Armour J. et al, Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate 
Governance, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 41, 2003, pp. 531-555 
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demand for CSR among investors is attributed partly to the subjective 
preferences of individual investors and partly to the belief that these stocks are 
more immune to market risks in the long run. Corporations that want to gain 
access to capital held by SRI funds, or wish to be included in selective social 
indexes such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index or FTSE4GOOD, must 
comply with a range of social and environmental requirements and routinely 
disclose non-financial reports. This creates an additional incentive for 
corporations to upgrade their social and environmental profile. 
 
 
9.- Finally, it has been argued that corporations with high social and 
environmental profile are likely to have an advantage over their competitors in 
recruiting skilled workforce, particularly in knowledge based industries15. 
Empirical studies show that an organization’s social profile matters to 
employees who have the potential to advance CSR directly, by actively 
advocating for, leading and participating in CSR initiatives as well as indirectly, 
by reciprocating socially responsible corporate behavior through better 
performance and firm loyalty16. 
 
 
10.- In spite of the aforementioned explanations, the possibility that 
CSR could also be used to disguise shareholder expropriation by management 
and/or controlling shareholders cannot be ex ante dismissed17. There is an 
inherent risk that the motivation behind the engagement of managers or 
controlling shareholders in certain CSR activities is associated with the 
possibility to expropriate private benefits of control. For example, when a CEO, 
an owner or a controlling shareholder decides on a donation to a certain charity, 
she might be expecting to boost her reputation or receive other perks in return.  
 
 
11.- Whenever CSR is driven by purely business considerations, the 
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders coincide. Strategic CSR is the 
term used to describe corporate actions which are designed to enhance profits 
and shareholder value, by means of allocating resources in order to meet social 
or environmental objectives. In those cases the motivation behind corporate 
                                                 
15 Vogel, D., The Market for Virtue – The Potentials and Limits of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Harrisonburg, VA: Brookings Institution Press, 2005. 
16 See Aguilera et al., Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multi-Level 
Theory of Social Change in Organizations. Academy of Management Review, Forthcoming, 
2007,  Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=820466  
17 Ehrhardt O. et al., Private Benefits and Minority Shareholder Expropriation (or What Exactly 
are Private Benefits of Control?) EFA 2003 Annual Conference Paper No. 809. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=423506 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.423506 
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engagement in CSR is to increase rather than sacrifice profits. However, 
wherever CSR does not serve financial performance, the tension between 
shareholders and other stakeholders would immediately surface. Sacrificing 
profits in the social interest is in itself extremely controversial. It raises 
important questions, normative as well as positive. On a normative level there 
is disagreement over the question whether corporations should and/or could 
sacrifice parts of their profits in the social interest to begin with, and under what 
conditions they may do so. It is often argued that the sacrifice of profits reflects 
a moral duty that corporations allegedly have towards society; however (as it 
was shown almost one century ago in the Ford Dodge controversy18), the 
corporate duty of loyalty towards its shareholders must not be overlooked. 
More specifically, what qualifies the corporation or any of its organs to decide 
on non-business issues on behalf of its shareholders? Finally, from a social 
welfare perspective, how could we determine whether the social benefits 
derived from CSR compensate for the forgone profits? The methodology used 
to cope with the abovementioned questions cannot be confined to the 
framework of corporate governance, law, finance or economics. The context of 
the normative debate over the nature of CSR, the role of business corporations 
in society and the corporate objective function is by far broader19. 
Consequently, an interdisciplinary approach is better suited to address the 
puzzle of CSR and the many questions it brings about20. Given the importance 
of these questions it is obvious why the dispute over CSR is so vivid. Although 
it is not feasible to go through all the approaches towards CSR, the following 
maps two of the main attitudes in a nutshell21. 
a) On one side of the spectrum stands Nobel Prize winner Milton 
Friedman and his followers who claim that the social responsibility of 
corporations is to increase their profits and maximize shareholders’ value22. 
According to this view, under the assumptions of a perfect market, 
shareholders’ value maximization would result in an increase in social welfare, 
since shareholders are the residual claimants. Put simply, corporations ought to 
focus on what they do best, which is maximizing shareholder value rather than 
attempting to satisfy the interests of multiple stakeholders. Consistent with this 
view, environmental and social concerns are best left for the government or the 
                                                 
18 Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668. (Mich. 1919) 
19 See Licht A., The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive 
Style, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2004, pp. 649-746 
20 Such an interdisciplinary approach is taken by Hay B. L. et al (eds), Environmental 
Protection and the Social Responsibility of Firms: Perspectives from Law, Economic and 
Business, RFF Press, Washington DC, 2005 
21 See also, in the Italian literature, Costi R, La responsabilità sociale dell’impresa e il diritto 
azionario italiano, in La responsabilità dell’impresa, Giuffrè, Milano, 2006, p. 83 
22 Friedman M., The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, The New York 
Times Magazine, September 13, 1970. 
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non profit sector to deal with. Friedman’s attitude towards CSR as a concept 
features a fair amount of hostility and suspicion. According to his perception, 
the mere idea that corporations have a social responsibility other than to make 
as much money for their shareholders might undermine the foundations of the 
free American capitalist society. Friedman is of the opinion that stakeholder 
theory and CSR could lead to harmful market distortions and create an obstacle 
for welfare creation. This belief is based on the assumption that managers 
cannot be held accountable if they are told to pursue multiple objectives, rather 
than simply maximize shareholder value. In line with this view, a single 
measurement criterion is necessary to evaluate manager’s performance and 
hence attain optimal results. 
 
b) On the other side of the spectrum are the proponents of the 
stakeholder theory23, who claim that shareholders need not be seen as the 
exclusive residual claimants and therefore corporations should address the 
needs and interests of various stakeholders, such as employees, consumers, 
members of the community and more generally the environment in which they 
operate. This approach rejects the neo-classical assumptions about perfect 
markets and zero externalities and further suggests that value maximization is 
not a value in itself. In line with this approach, corporations ought to have a 
moral commitment towards society in return for their so called “license to 
operate” which allows shareholders to enjoy corporate profits. Although the 
debate over the maximands of corporate governance is far from reaching an 
end, lately there have been attempts to converge some of the conflicting 
approaches. Jensen, for instance, proposes an enlightened stakeholder theory, 
according to which, corporations should take into account the interests of 
various stakeholders, as long as it is likely to be in the interest of the 
shareholders in the long run24. Many European member states reflected recently 
this approach in their description of company purposes25 
 
                                                 
23 For an overview of the fundamentals of stakeholder theory see Freeman R.E., Strategic 
Management: A Stakeholder Perspective, Boston: Pitman, 1984. Another parallel theory which 
shares common features with stakeholder theory has been advanced by Blair M. M., Ownership 
and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century, Brookings 
Institution 1995; Blair M. M and Stout L., A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, 1999 
24 Jensen M., Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 
European Financial Management Review, N. 7, 2001.  
25 This continental approach – already witnessed e.g. in France and Germany – was recently 
accepted also in the United Kingdom (see clause 156 of the Bill for company law reform and all 
relevant preparatory documents of the Steering Group): Birds J., Reforming UK Company Law 
in a European Context: a Long And Winding Road, in European Company Law in Accelerated 
Progress, eds. Bartman, Kluwer Int.,  2006, p. 18. 
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12.- On a positive level, assuming that at least some corporations 
decide, for whatever reason, to devote resources to CSR and given the fact that 
this investment has certain costs, the following calls for attention - Can 
corporations sacrifice profits in the social interest on a sustainable basis? CSR 
is often described as a factor that contributes to competitiveness26. However, 
the competitive environment in which corporations operate plays a key role, 
since the constraints in product markets, financial markets and the market for 
corporate control may narrow the corporation’s ability to invest in CSR. 
Corporations that engage in CSR need to finance these activities in one way or 
the other. For instance, they can charge higher prices from consumers, cut the 
distribution of dividends, reduce employees’ wages or save on marketing, 
operations and R&D budgets. Consequently, corporations that invest in CSR 
face the risk of becoming an easy prey for their competitors that do not 
undertake similar investments. Given this asymmetry, the latter enjoy the 
potential advantage of being able to offer cheaper products, higher wages and 
more generous dividends. Moreover, to the extent that corporations that invest 
in CSR are envisaged as inefficient, the risk of being taken over by their rivals 
would be significantly higher in the market for corporate control. Conversely, 
in the absence of perfect competition, corporations that enjoy a degree of 
market power will be those who could afford investment in CSR. For instance, 
a monopoly could distribute its monopoly rent to various corporate 
stakeholders27 or invest in reputation building that increases public and 
regulatory support. In other words, engagement in CSR might serve as means to 
create entry or expansion barriers that deter potential competitors from entering 
a certain market28. 
 
 
13.- Having touched some of the focal controversies related to CSR, it is 
evident that many questions remain open and there is plenty of room for future 
academic research on CSR and corporate governance. In reality, however, more 
and more people have come to realize that the price associated with various 
corporate externalities has become too high. For them, the aggregate effect of 
externalities has become unacceptable in terms of social harms. Since the 
industrial revolution, market forces and free competition have led to an 
unprecedented accumulation of wealth in most capitalist societies. Due to a 
                                                 
26 See Porter et al., Strategy & Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and 
Corporate Social Responsibility of Corporate Philanthropy, Harvard Business Online, 2006 
27 See Roe M. J., Rents and their Corporate Consequences, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 53, 
2001; Roe M. J., Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, 
Corporate Impact, Oxford University Press, 2003 
28 McWilliams, A. et al, Raising Rivals' Costs: An Application of Resource-Based Theory, 
Journal of Management Studies, 39(5), 2002, pp. 707-723 
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variety of reasons, significant externalities that were generated by corporations 
remained outside the price equation29. Once the externalities and their 
devastating effect have become known, it was no longer possible to ignore or 
dismiss them. Trusting the free market to solve the problem of externalities 
turned to be unrealistic. A laissez fair approach that relies solely on market 
forces to eliminate externalities through Coasian bargaining could work only in 
theory, under the strict assumptions of perfect markets. To this end, high 
transaction costs and imperfect information tend to frustrate attempts to reach 
an efficient equilibrium. Experience shows that alternative techniques to deal 
with corporate externalities, using state authority, such as command and control 
regulation are only partially effective, due to information asymmetries, 
regulatory capture, enforcement problems and high transaction costs. However, 
CSR, combined with mandatory minimum regulatory standards, has the 
potential to cope more successfully with corporate externalities and deliver 
better results. The challenge is to find further ways to make corporations 
voluntarily bind themselves to this principal effort30. The strongest potential 
incentive for corporations to engage in CSR is financial in its essence. Demand 
for CSR in itself could not however yield the desired change unless two further 
conditions are satisfied. 
 
a) First, the screening of corporations with superior social and 
environmental profile should be facilitated. This depends on the extent and 
quality of non-financial information that circulates in the market. It is necessary 
to assure that non-financial information disclosed by corporations is credible 
and verifiable, by choosing the most suitable reporting form and measurement 
metrics. At the same time, costs of compliance with any reporting requirements 
should be kept at a minimal level. Given the fact that social reporting is not 
mandatory, it is necessary to construct a reporting system that yields reliable 
and useful information at the lowest possible cost. 
 
b) Second, corporate governance systems that induce CSR without 
compromising the level of investor protection should be designed. Allen argues 
that a narrow view of corporate governance to maximize shareholder value 
leads to an efficient allocation of resources only when markets are perfect and 
complete31. Since these assumptions are hardly ever satisfied in real markets, 
Allen proposes a broader view, according to which corporate governance is 
                                                 
29 See Kapp K.W., The Social Cost of Private Enterprise, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts 1950;  
30 On the importance of voluntary corporate action rather than statutory restrictions see Mitchell 
L. E., Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry into the Causes of 
Corporate Immorality, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 477, 1995. 
31 Allen F., Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
2005, 21(2), pp. 164-177 
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concerned with ensuring that firms are run in such a way that society’s 
resources are used efficiently. Interestingly, recent studies in finance and 
corporate governance suggest that absolute adherence to the shareholder 
primacy norm does not necessarily reflect efficiency32. Consequently, the great 
challenge is to design a corporate governance system that will support, rather 
than constrain, CSR and at the same time fulfill its core financial function, 
namely to assure the suppliers of finance to the corporation against 
expropriation of their investment33. 
 
 
14.- The other step that is proposed to ameliorate corporate social 
behavior involves internalization of a new social norm by corporate insiders. A 
new social norm which calls for greater corporate social responsibility and 
accountability is paving its way to the mainstream. This norm has not yet been 
fully recognized and it is not likely to be endorsed by legislators, although it is 
rapidly spreading. In the minds of millions of people all over the world the 
image of the corporation is shifting and more emphasis is given to corporate 
citizenship as well as social and environmental performance34. If this norm 
would eventually be internalized by corporate insiders, such as dominant 
shareholders, CEOs, corporate directors and members of senior management, 
corporations might end up improving their conduct due to internal progression 
rather than external pressure. There is extensive evidence that shows how 
powerful social norms could be in the individual context35. The argument 
                                                 
32 Fisch, J. E., Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 
Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 105, 2005, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=878391; Elhague E., Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public 
Interest, New York University Law Review, Vol. 80 No. 3, 2005 
33 Compare also with Tirole J., Corporate Governance, Econometrica Vol. 69, No.1 2001, pp. 
1-35 
34 See Aguilera et al., Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multi-Level 
Theory of Social Change in Organizations. Academy of Management Review, Forthcoming, 
2007, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=820466 
35 For a general introduction to social norms from a law and economics perspective see 
Ellickson, R. C., Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 1991; Ellickson, R. C., The Market for Social Norms, 3 American Law 
and Economics Review 1, 2001, Cooter, R. D., The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the 
New Law Merchant, 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1643, 1996; Elster, J., Social 
Norms and Economic Theory. 3 Journal of Economic Perspectives 99-117, 1989. For an 
overview of the vibrant debate over the effect of social norms on corporate law see Symposium 
on Norms and Corporate Law. 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1607, 2001 and 
also Eisenberg, M. A. Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 Columbia Law Review 1253, 
1999;; Vandenbergh, M. P., Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in 
Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 Stanford Environmental Law Journal 55, 2003; 
Mitchell, L. E., Understanding Norms, 49 University of Toronto Law Journal 177, 1999. 
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suggested here is that social norms have the potential to alter organizational and 
specifically corporate actions as well. On one level, a social norm internalized 
by the public could exert external pressure on corporations that wish to satisfy 
the expectations of current and potential consumers and investors. In turn, such 
pressure could enhance corporate motivation to engage in CSR. On a different 
level, a social norm could bring about motivation to engage in CSR from within 
the corporation rather than as a response to external pressure. The rationale 
behind this argument is straightforward - the human beings who navigate the 
corporate entity are not immune to social norms by which they are surrounded. 
Therefore, the road to change the way corporations act passes in the minds and 
hearts of those who run them. 
 
 
15.- This is why we believe the articles of association discussed herein 
mark an unprecedented advance in the field and deserve close scrutiny. 
 
 
 
 
